Transactions take place in the rm rather than in the market because the rm o ers agents who make speci c investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the rm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. Access can be better than ownership because: i the power agents get from access is more contingent on them making the right i n vestment; ii ownership has adverse e ects on the incentive to specialize. The theory explains the importance of internal organization and third party o wnership.
to the details of the idea, if the resource is a person, access is the ability t o w ork closely with the person. The agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make herself valuable. When combined with her pre-existing residual right to withdraw her human capital, access gives her the ability to create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized human capital. Control over this critical resource is a source of power as, more generally, i s control over any critical resource. Since the amount of surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her making the right speci c investment than the surplus that comes from ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than ownership.
The main results of our analysis are best illustrated through an example. Consider an island economy where there are many cobblers and only one sewing machine. A tanner, who is the only one on the island who makes thick leather t for shoes, wants cobblers to co-operate in a new enterprise where the cobblers will manufacture shoes out of the tanner's leather. In order to produce shoes with this machine the cobblers have to specialize their human capital and, possibly, the machine. Thus, cobblers need access to the sewing machine to specialize.
Start by assuming that the tanner owns the sewing machine. If access is contractible, and all ex-ante side payments possible, how should he regulate access to it? If the task of sewing is such that only one cobbler can be used nally i.e., specialized cobblers are perfect substitutes, then it is optimal to concede access to only one cobbler. Giving multiple cobblers access will depress each one's incentive to specialize since they know only one will be chosen nally and also result in much w asteful duplicate investment.
The answer di ers, however, if sewing can be broken into two tasks where the total output is dependent on the sum of speci c investments, i.e., speci c investments are additive. Suppose that the tanner instructs one cobbler to specialize in making shoes with laces, and the other to make slip-ons. Now, the cobblers are not perfect substitutes, but they are substitutes at the margin an additional lace shoe is a close substitute to an additional slip-on. By allocating access in this way, the tanner depresses each individual cobbler's incentive t o i n vest, but he spurs greater aggregate investment b y creating a rat race" among the cobblers. The best of the two cobblers will be more valuable to the tanner and, thus, will enjoy relatively more rents. Access can be a better mechanism than ownership because the power from having access may be more contingent on speci c investment than the power from ownership. In fact, the tanner can sometimes obtain the rst best level of aggregate investment b y o ering access to the right n umber of cobblers.
Finally, if sewing consists of tasks where the speci c investments are complementary one task is to sew the leather sole, the other the leather upper, then only one cobbler should receive access again. Access to a complementary task grants too much hold-up power to each cobbler. This increases each cobbler's rents but decreases her incentive t o i n vest.
Thus depending on the way i n vestments made by the cobblers who have access are combined to form total output, the optimal number of cobblers who should have access is determined. The regulation of access is thus a viable mechanism to promote speci c investment.
But why should the tanner own the sewing machine our initial assumption? In fact, in the spirit of the property rights view, one would be tempted to argue that a better solution is to let a cobbler own. After all, she is the only one making relationship-speci c investments that need to be protected. Ownership by the cobbler, however, is ine cient whenever specialization reduces the cobbler's opportunities with the sewing machine outside the relationship. Imagine that, as an independent contractor, an unspecialized cobbler who owns the sewing machine can accept a large variety of assignments including repairing shoes and bags, and making leather jackets. After specializing to shoe making, however, the cobbler and her machine may h a ve become too specialized to satisfy the needs of a diverse clientele. The only activity the cobbler can then do without the tanner is to repair shoes. Then, the cobbler e ectively reduces her outside option and bargaining power by specializing and this decreases her incentive to specialize. By contrast, if she did not own the machine, she would not be concerned by the loss of outside opportunities because her alternatives for example, work as an unskilled laborer would not be a ected by specialization. Therefore, ownership by the tanner is clearly superior.
In sum, not only do we highlight the importance of access as an alternative w ay of conferring power, but we also highlight the dark side of ownership. This has a number of implications.
First, we can de ne a rm both in terms of unique assets which m a y b e p h ysical or human and in terms of the people who have access to these assets. Not only does this bring people other than the owners within the boundary of the rm it also introduces a separate role for the rm in creating an ex ante environment that encourages investment. 1 This is di erent from its ex post 1 Throughout the paper, the terms ex ante and ex post are used with respect to the timing of investment. role in protecting the returns to speci c investment.
Second, access allocates power without relying on future outside enforcement. Consequently, a rm or, more broadly, an organization, can be de ned even absent legal enforcement. Our framework, thus, can be applied to organizations in environments where property rights are not well de ned, are poorly enforced, or cannot be enforced as with illegal organizations such as the Ma a. A rm can also be de ned even though its output requires no critical physical assets whose property rights can be assigned. Third, our model points out that insecurity m a y encourage rather than discourage speci c investment. This result can explain a variety of institutional arrangements, like certain forms of franchising or the fact that residual rights of control are generally held by shareholders and not workers. Also, the adverse e ects of ownership we identify might explain why in many relationships the residual rights of control are allocated to a third disinterested party, such a s a n arbitrator.
Last but not least, our approach vindicates the role played by i n ternal organization in enhancing the value of the rm. The essence of internal organization, we argue, is the di erential access agents within the rm have to the unique physical and human assets that compose the core of the rm. By con ning an agent's ability t o i n vest to certain areas, internal organization prevents her from ine ciently acquiring power in other areas. Internal organization thus enables a rm to co-ordinate, and enhance, overall specialization.
Our work is part of a growing literature on the economics of organizations. In particular, Aghion and Tirole 1997 study the e ects of the allocation of control rights on the incentive to acquire information. They do not, however, focus on the mechanisms through which the organization allocates the control rights, an issue central to our paper. Zwiebel 1996a, 1996b also study the e ects on bargaining of allowing multiple agents within a rm. However, their primary focus is on the ex post rent sharing process, while ours is on ex ante investment incentives. Finally, the nature of the boundaries of the rm has been recently studied by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1995 . Their analysis, though, focuses on the conditions necessary to support implicit contracts in a repeated relationship.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I we describe our basic framework. In section II, we explore the role of regulated access as a mechanism to motivate speci c investments.
In section III, we analyze why o wnership of an asset does not provide better incentives than access. In section IV, we show h o w restricted access within the rm can complement the right o wnership structure in providing better incentives, thus providing a rationale for internal organization. In sections V and VI, we discuss applications. Section VII concludes.
I Framework
An entrepreneur, E, o wns a unique machine henceforth the asset" which is required for production. The entrepreneur, however, needs the help of some managers, M, to produce or market the output. The entrepreneur is the tanner, managers are the cobblers, and the asset is the sewing machine in the example. The managers have to make a n i n vestment that is speci c to the asset. This may consist of their specializing their human capital e.g., learning how to mass-produce shoes and, possibly, of their specializing the asset to themselves and the task e.g., irreversibly welding the machine settings in a preferred way to handle thick shoe leather. It will, however, be simpler to start with investment only a ecting human capital and not physical capital. Later, we will examine the consequences if investment a ects the physical asset.
Since investment is speci c to the machine and to its use with E, w e assume that no M can make the investment if she does not have access to the crucial asset. 2 We denote M j 's speci c investment, made at date 0, by i j , where i j is both the level and the manager's private cost of investment. There is a reason for assuming linearity. Our focus is on how the optimal allocation of access to di erent managers depends on the way di erent speci c investments combine to produce output. If the marginal cost of investment is increasing or, equivalently, there is a capacity constraint on managerial e ort, there will be an obvious reason to o er multiple managers access. Since this will be true with any production technology, independent o f h o w the speci c investments combine, we assume linear costs to eliminate this e ect.
If only one manager specializes and she works together with E and the asset, then they 2 If the speci c investment requires at least some modi cation of the asset, it is obvious that the manager has to be granted access to the asset. But even if the investment is in learning asset-speci c or people-speci c skills, speci city implies that the rm is somewhat unique in the economy in possessing the knowledge, assets or people necessary for production, and it will be di cult to specialize without being given access. This is especially true if the learning is tacit and has to be experienced rather than taught. produce revenue of Ri at date 2. Ri is a standard concave production function, i.e., R 0 i 0 and R 00 i 0; 1 with lim i!0 R 0 i = 1 and lim i!1 R 0 i = 0, where R 0 i denotes the rst derivative o f R with respect to i. I f m ultiple Ms specialize, then the total production depends on how the speci c investments of di erent managers combine. We distinguish three cases:
First, speci c investments can be perfect substitutes. This is the case if only one manager is needed in the production process and the human capital acquired by other managers cannot be transferred to her. Ex post, it is e cient to pick the most specialized manager to produce. If so, when n expert managers specialize, total production is Ri = Rmaxfi j g n j=1 :
2 Second, speci c investments may be additive. Additivity is likely if the technology is such that each manager can work on her own piece" and the pieces merge seamlessly at the interface. For instance, if the manager's job is to get to know a group of clients well, the investment b y two managers is likely to be additive if they focus on di erent groups. The total value of joint production employing n expert managers is then Ri = R n X j=1 i j :
3 For now, we will assume that additivity is a property of the technology. Later, we will argue that a rm can make a production process additive in speci c investments.
Third, speci c investments may b e complementary if the tasks the expert managers are required to do are mutually dependent. Complementarity occurs if each manager's marginal contribution from specializing depends crucially on the specialization of the other managers. This resembles the technology in Hart and Moore 1990 . Formally, Ri = Ri 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i n ; 4 with R jl 0 8j 6 = l and R jj 0, where the subscripts to functions indicate partials with respect to the j th and l th arguments. For consistency with the case where there is only one investment, we also assume that Ri 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i n has decreasing return to scale and that lim i k !0 R k :::i k ::: = 1 and lim i k !1 R k :::i k ::: = 0 .
Clearly, i n vestments can combine in other ways, but a large number of plausible situations are covered by the above cases. The sequence of events is described in Figure I . At date 0, the asset owner chooses how many managers can have access to the machine. The managers who receive access choose their level of relationship-speci c investment b e t ween date 0 and date 1. The investment is not contractible. As in the property rights literature, at date 0 no date-1 variable is contractible except the allocation of the asset's ownership. 3 Since access is granted at date 0, we assume that it is perfectly contractible. No agent is liquidity constrained so any e x a n te side payment is possible.
At date 1, all the aspects of the relationship become contractible. As a result, the revenue that will be generated at date 2 which could not be contractually divided before is allocated through bargaining at date 1. We follow Hart and Moore 1990 in adopting the Shapley value as our solution concept for the bargaining game. 4 The Shapley value gives any agent j her expected contribution to a coalition, where the expectation is taken over all coalitions to which j might belong. More formally, agent j's share 3 In particular, this assumption rules out pro t sharing or revenue sharing agreements at date 0. See footnote 7 in Hart and Moore 1990 for a justi cation of this assumption. where s = jSj is the number of agents in coalition S, n+1 is the total number of agents bargaining, vS is the revenue produced by coalition S, and vSnfjg is the revenue produced by coalition S without agent j.
In order to compute the Shapley value, we h a ve to specify the revenue produced by each coalition S. W e assume the asset is required for production to take place so any coalition that does not have the asset generates no revenue. Any coalition that has the asset, the entrepreneur, E, and some managers, M, produces Ri where i is the vector of investments made by managers in the coalition. The revenue produced by E together with the asset but without any managers is r E , which does not depend on i because investments are in human capital. It follows that r E = R0. To simplify notation, we assume that both E and all Mshave no outside value without the asset.
At date 2, the revenue is divided according to the contractual agreements signed at date 1. The payo s are expressed in date 0 dollars. We also assume that all the parties are risk-neutral. So, each agent will maximize the net value of its date 2 payo .
II Access as a Mechanism to Foster Speci c Investments
By regulating access at date 0, the owner a ects the managers' ability and incentives to invest. Moreover, by specifying who is given access and who is not, the owner de nes the ex ante boundaries of the rm. This section shows how these boundaries depend critically on the way speci c investments combine together, i.e., the nature of the technology of investment.
Since access is contractible, and no one is liquidity constrained, E will maximize the total ex ante expected surplus net of investment costs. If access is not contractible for instance, if access depends on hard to verify aspects such as the degree to which the owner shares information or the managers cannot pay for it ex-ante because they are liquidity constrained, then E will care, not only about the e ciency of the arrangement, but also about his ability to extract ex post surplus. At the end of this section we brie y discuss how the results would change. For a paper developing this approach see Rajan and Zingales 1997 . 
A Substitute Investments
When speci c investments made by di erent Ms are substitutes, the owner is always better o selling access to just one manager. We shall prove this with just two managers, M 1 and M 2 , who have to decide their level of investment i 1 and i 2 . Similar logic, though, applies with multiple managers.
First let only one manager be given access. At date 1, the manager and the entrepreneur bargain over surplus. The manager's Shapley value is just the Nash bargaining solution, i.e., she will get 1 2 Ri , R0. Thus at date 0, the manager invests i such that R 0 i = 2. So there is underinvestment relative to the rst best level which solves R 0 i = 1 . Now let two managers have access. When speci c investments are substitutes, the value of joint production when both managers are present i s g i v en by Rmaxfi 1 ; i 2 g. Using formula 5, we can compute M 1 's payo for a given level of investment b y M 2 . This is given by Given the discontinuity of the best response function, it is easy to see that there is no symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. There exist, however, a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and two asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies which w e c haracterize in the following lemma: Lemma 1. When two managers are given access and investments are substitutes, there are three Nash equilibria. Two asymmetric equilibria are in pure strategies; one manager invests i and the other manager invests i, where i is such that R 0 i = 6 and i is such that R 0 i = 2 .
The symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies; each manager randomizes continuously over the interval i; i , and the mixing cumulative distribution function Gi is given by Gi = 3 R 0 i , 1 2 :
In the symmetric equilibrium, each manager expects to earn 1 6 Ri , R0 , i.
Proof of Lemma 1. See the appendix.
Proposition 1. When the speci c investments are substitutes, giving access to a single expert manager results in a level of total output that is at least as large, and a level of output net of investment costs that is strictly larger, than granting access to two expert managers.
Proof of Proposition 1. See the appendix. It is immediate that the two asymmetric equilibria generate the same level of total output as the equilibrium with one manager, but lead to some wasteful investment b y the manager who is not chosen to produce. Similarly, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium generates at best the same level of output but more wasteful investments.
Since access is contractible, E wants ex-ante e ciency. So when investments are perfect substitutes, E will restrict access to one manager. However, if we consider a milder form of substitutability e.g., investments are additive it turns out that the entrepreneur is better o by giving access to more than one manager. This is what we show n o w.
B Additive I n vestments
Now let investments be additive. Unlike when investments are substitutes, the two-manager case can be qualitatively di erent from the n-manager case. So we start by developing some general expressions which w e then specialize. Let the owner give access to n managers, making a total of n + 1 participants in the bargaining. Using formula 5 we can compute manager k's payo as a function of her investment level i k given that the other n , 1 identical managers have i n vested i n each, where the argument n indicates that the equilibrium is a function of the number of managers who were granted access. Their payo is 5 n X j=1 j nn + 1 Ri k + j , 1i n , Rj , 1i n , i k :
7 Di erentiating 7 with respect to i k and imposing symmetry, the symmetric Nash equilibrium level of investment i n is the solution to: ii if three managers are given access and R 00 i i s w eakly monotonic, the total amount o f investment is larger than if two managers had been given access.
Proof of Proposition 2. See the appendix.
Why does the investment level increase when two Ms h a ve access to the asset? The intuition is transparent when we examine the objective function manager 1 maximizes for a given level of investment b y manager 2 i.e., expression 7 for the case of two managers: The bargaining game ensures the manager's payo is a function, not only of her contribution to the grand coalition of all agents where her investment is marginal the term within the second set of square brackets, but also to sub coalitions where her contribution is infra-marginal the term within the rst set of square brackets and incentives higher. By contrast, if she were the only agent who received access, her marginal contribution to the grand coalition would be all that mattered. Thus, each manager's marginal incentive t o i n vest can be higher when multiple agents are given access.
In other words, the nature of the bargaining game gives the manager the illusion of a ecting her payo to a greater extent through investment. We s a y illusion because when a manager increases her level of investment, she has a negative impact on the other manager's payo . Because of concavity, the other manager's marginal contribution to any coalition where the rst manager is present decreases in the level of the rst manager's investment. Clearly, the rst manager does not internalize this e ect and, thus, ends up choosing a level of investment a b o ve the one that would be optimal for the two managers collectively. Similarly, for the other manager.
This result is particularly surprising in light of the following: 6 Corollary 1 . When two managers are granted access, they collectively get a lower net payo than a single manager with unique access.
Proof of Corollary 1. See the appendix.
In other words, by letting two Ms h a ve access to the asset, E sets up a rat race, which decreases the managers' average payo s, while increasing their marginal payo s from investment. When the number of managers is increased beyond two, each manager nds herself marginal at di erent points see expression 7. Furthermore, the probability of each of those points occurring depends on the number of managers. The monotonicity o f R 00 i ensures that the redistribution of probabilities that takes place with an increase in the number of managers from two to three 6 Zwiebel 1996a, 1996b show, using the Shapley value framework, that a multiplicity o f w orkers reduces the amount of surplus they are able to extract. What is novel here is that their ex ante investment increases.
shifts weights towards derivatives computed at lower levels of investment. The incentive t o i n vest at these points is higher, hence the second part of proposition 2.
It It is easy to verify that when n = 2 the equilibrium level of individual investment is 15 and the aggregate level 30. With n = 3 equilibrium level of individual investment is 9 and the aggregate level is lower at 27.
Even if the aggregate level of investment increases for any n, this does not necessarily imply that E will grant access to an in nite number of managers. Increasing n may lead to overinvestment i.e., P n j=1 i j i F B where R 0 i F B = 1. To understand why o verinvestment can take place, recall that managers see themselves as being infra-marginal some of the time. As a result, they might retain a positive incentive t o i n vest even when at the margin the net return on investment is negative.
Since access is contractible, E will choose the e cient n umber of managers modulo an integer problem because he can monetize the additional surplus from doing so when he sells access to the managers. This introduces precise limits to the number of managers that an owner wants to grant access to and, thus, precise limits to the rm.
To illustrate this, we make use of a speci c production function. This production function is concave though not strictly so, but R 00 16 is not de ned R 0 is not a continuous function. However, if we approximate R 0 with a continuous function, R 00 is non monotonic. Note also that this production function does not satisfy the condition that limi!0 R 0 i = 1. This condition, however, was imposed only to ensure that for any production function Ri a n i n terior solution exists with i 2 0; 1. In this particular example the parameters have been chosen so to ensure the existence of an interior solution, so the condition is unnecessary.
i the total amount o f i n vestment increases monotonically with the number of managers who are granted access at date 0.
ii if 4, the optimal number of managers who will be granted access to the asset is uniquely determined and equals n = ,1 ,4 .
Proof of Corollary 2. See the appendix. With a quadatric production function, the total amount o f i n vestment increases monotonically with the number of managers who are granted access at date 0. As a result, it will be optimal for E to increase this number so long as the aggregate investment does not exceed the rst best level. Hence, the unique optimal number of managers.
Summarizing, if investments are additive, E grants access to more than one expert manager. Then, if there is an n beyond which the level of aggregate investment exceeds the rst best level, this represents the optimal n, which E will choose. By contrast, if the level of aggregate investment increases with n without reaching the rst best level for any nite n, the rm will have no boundary. Additivity or linear costs, however, is not a tenable assumption when n becomes large. Above a certain threshold, coordination costs will go up while investments will overlap and become perfect substitutes e.g., there is a limit to which geographic territories can be nely divided without sales managers bumping into each other every day. So technology will eventually limit the size of the rm.
C Complementary Investments
Finally, let there be a predetermined number of complementary tasks for simplicity, t wo in each of which speci c investment is required. As in Hart and Moore 1990 , we assume that when two managers have access, each can invest in only one predetermined task we postpone the analysis of the case when managers' tasks are not predetermined to section IV. By contrast, when a single manager has access, we allow her to invest in both tasks otherwise it is obvious that letting at least two managers in is optimal. Since managers are pure substitutes if they invest in the same task, we need not analyze the case of more than two managers.
We assume that investment in either task has the same linear cost, and the tasks are symmetric with respect to the productivity o f i n vestment i.e., R 1 i A ; i B = R 2 i B ; i A .
Is E better o selling access to two managers or selling access to only one? If E o ers access to only one manager, then M will choose i A , i B so as to maximize Proof of Lemma 3. See the appendix. Thus far, there is nothing surprising. This is a standard concave programming problem where underinvestment results from the manager capturing only half the ex-post surplus generated by her investment while incurring the full cost. More interesting is to compare the single-manager outcome to the case when two managers have access. In this case, the two managers will choose i A and i B in a non-co-operative w ay. Without loss of generality, let us assume that M 1 specializes in task A and M 2 in task B. If two managers are granted access, the level of speci c investment i n e a c h task is lower than that obtained if only one manager were granted access.
Proof of Proposition 3. See the appendix.
Therefore, when investments are complementary, E again does not want to give access to multiple managers. Unlike the case of additive i n vestments, investment g o e s d o wn if E gives access to multiple managers. The reason for the di erence is that if investments are complementary, each manager has greater hold up power. When one manager withdraws her human capital, not only does she reduce output, but she also a ects the other manager's marginal incentives to invest. Of course, a single manager does not face this problem. Interestingly, the problem arises because each manager has too much, not too little, power. In fact, if the complementarity o f i n vestments is extreme i.e., Ri A 1 ; 0 = R0; i B 2 = R0; 0, then the two managers together extract a higher proportion of the surplus than a single manager. Yet their investment incentives are lower.
D Access and the Nature of Investment.
What we h a ve seen above is that depending on how i n vestments by di erent managers are related, the optimal amount of access a orded by the entrepreneur changes. Thus, access is a meaningful mechanism by which the owner provides incentives for speci c investments. The nature of bargaining suggests that when multiple managers get access, their investment incentives both at the margin when all the managers are part of the grand coalition and the infra-margin when they are part of sub-coalitions containing E matter. When investments are substitutes, managerial incentives at the margin are small since managers compete with each other. That leaves only the infra-marginal incentives which are also small. By contrast, with complementary investments, managerial incentives at the margin are higher because investments complement each other, but are small at the infra-margin for the same reason. In either case, giving access to one manager is better than giving access to multiple managers. With additive i n vestments, however, while the marginal incentive is not much smaller than when a single manager has access, the infra-marginal incentive can be substantially larger. Thus aggregate investment can be higher with multiple managers. Interestingly, the incentives to specialize that multiple managers have do not bear a close relationship to the total rents they extract. When investments are complementary, incentives are low but rent extraction is high because each manager can threaten the entire surplus. When investments are substitutes, incentives are low and rent extraction is low because each manager is replaceable. Finally, when investments are additive, managers are partially replaceable, so rent extraction is low e v en though incentives are high. E Access is Not Contractible.
One could also take the view that providing access" includes not only physical access to the unique machine or person, but also the co-operation of the person being specialized to, friendly co-workers, a good environment, etc. Further, providing access" is sometimes not a momentary action but a process which cannot be continuously veri ed by the courts.
It is, therefore, plausible that whether a manager is given access can be observed by all parties, but is not veri able by the courts, and hence not contractible. If so, E's decision to regulate access will be a ected not only by e ciency but also by the desire to extract surplus ex post. When investments are substitutes or when investments are additive, the presence of multiple managers who specialize makes it easier for E to extract more surplus in the bargaining at date 1. The non contractibility of access will tend to increase the number of managers E gives access to also see Zwiebel 1996a, 1996b . When investments are complements, however, having more managers makes more of them critical, which increases their collective ability to extract rents. The non-contractibility of access will tend to reduce the number of managers here.
F Access and Ownership
We h a ve shown that the regulation of access represents a useful mechanism to motivate relationshipspeci c investments. Access imposes well de ned ex ante boundaries to a rm. It is useful to discuss the several ways in which access di ers from the concept of ownership de ned in the property rights literature, especially Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and Moore 1990 . 9 Before we make the comparison, however, let us reacquaint the reader with why o wnership matters in the GHM framework. Essentially, at date 1, the owner of physical assets has the residual rights of control over them. For instance, he can threaten to withdraw them from the production process. Such a threat will give him a greater share of the surplus. Of course, a greater share of the ex post surplus, by itself, has no e ect on the marginal incentive t o i n vest. However, if the value of the owner together with the asset outside the relationship increases with 9 The mechanism of access is di erent from the concept of an e ciency wage. With e ciency wages, the rm agrees to paying a worker above-market wages so that ring becomes more painful to the worker and she shirks less. Wages are typically not contingent o n i n vestment, and the commitment to pay a b o ve-market wages to those who work and re those who shirk is assumed. By contrast, access enables workers to gain power through their own e ort which not only makes their payo contingent on e ort, but also forces the rm to pay. the investment made speci cally for the relationship, then the value of the owner's threat to withdraw assets, and his share of surplus, increases with speci c investment. Hence ownership can provide the owner with incentives for specialization even though investment is not directly contractible. Now let us compare our notion of access with ownership.
First, in the GHM framework, a rm is de ned at date 0 as a collection of assets that will be jointly owned at data 1. Thus ownership at date 0 is immaterial and does not provide any restrictions on the boundary of the rm. Moreover, whether people belong" to a rm or not is irrelevant. This is because in their model all agents have a nonnegative impact on the value of production and on the incentive t o i n vest, so no agent is excluded from the rm. Since meaningful inclusion necessarily requires exclusion, in GHM there is no sense in which an agent belongs to a rm. By contrast, in our framework the rm is de ned at date 0. It is a collection of commonly owned critical resources, talents, and ideas, and also the people who have access to those resources. Second, the right to o er access belongs to anyone who has command over a valuable source of rents. Therefore, while the right to concede access can certainly emanate from a date-0 ownership right to a critical physical asset, this is by no means the only source. A talented person, for instance, can regulate access to herself and her knowledge because she owns her human capital. Similarly, the head of a Ma a family can prevent outsiders from gaining access, because the members of the organization are tied to him through loyalty, obedience, and fear.
This leads to the third main di erence between access and ownership: the enforcement system. In order to be e ective, the ownership right requires some outside authority to enforce it. Without an outside enforcer, ownership is meaningless and no rm can be de ned. By contrast, the regulation of access can be used as a mechanism to foster speci c investments even absent a n exogenous enforcement system. 10 Thus, our framework can be usefully applied to organizations in environments where property rights are not well de ned or are poorly enforced for instance, illegal organizations such as the Ma a which, by de nition, cannot rely on legal enforcement.
Finally, when an agent gets ownership of a physical asset, he obtains the residual rights of control over the asset. Since these residual rights are obtained unconditionally, they typically 10 It could be argued that the entrepreneur requires a legal infrastructure to provide access to only a few and exclude others. This is only true if the source of value is a physical asset. If it is the entrepreneur's human capital, an innovation that cannot be patented, or valuable clients, all he has to do is refuse to work, or share information, with managers to exclude them. Also, nothing requires access to be contractible for it to be an e ective mechanism. guarantee a bigger share of the surplus to the owner, regardless of the owner's action. In other words, ownership provides security which m a y breed complacence. By contrast, the manager who is given access gets no new residual rights of control. All she has is her residual right to withdraw her human capital. What access does is to let her make this residual right v aluable by giving her the opportunity to specialize her human capital. Since the power over surplus that she gets from access is likely to be more contingent on her making the right i n vestment than the power coming from ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than ownership. In other words, because the manager is powerless unless she invests, access gives better incentives to invest than ownership.
More mechanically, the incomplete contract literature suggests that rms are composed of ex ante structures which make the ability to extract payo s i.e., power contingent o n i n vestments, when neither the investment nor the nal payo are contractible. Regulated access provides a way to do this with contractibility assumptions that are weaker than the ones necessary for ownership to be a viable mechanism. In sum, access is relevant e v en in a world without property rights. But if property rights do exist, and are enforced, why are they not used instead of access to provide incentives? This is the subject of the next section.
III Why Access and Not Ex-Post Ownership
Both access and ownership are mechanisms by which an agent's power over surplus is made contingent on her speci c investment, even though investment is not directly contractible. We believe that access is often used in preference to ownership, and perhaps too much importance has been attributed to the latter in de ning the boundaries of the rm. Why w ould access be preferred to ownership? We examine three reasons. The rst is that ownership can adversely a ect incentives to make speci c investment. The second is that even if ownership does not reduce the incentive to specialize per se, it can crowd out the incentives created by regulated access. Finally, o wnership is a commodity in limited supply, s o i f m a n y agents require incentives to specialize, the regulation of access will be an important alternative mechanism.
A The Adverse E ect of Ownership Within the property rights framework, conferring ownership on an agent never reduces her incentives to make speci c investments. Thus, the fundamental question in that framework is whom ownership should be allocated to among the group of productive agents rather than whether ownership should belong to anyone in that group at all.
By relaxing alternative assumptions in the property rights framework, however, we can show ownership of assets can reduce the incentive to make speci c investments. Interestingly, in all the cases the intuition for why o wnership reduces the incentives to invest is the same. By specializing, an agent forgoes alternative opportunities outside the relationship. The loss of these opportunities reduces the agent's incentives to invest. An owner has a larger opportunity set, and in a variety of circumstances, can face a greater loss of opportunities from specialization. Thus ownership may reduce the incentives to specialize.
To facilitate comparison, we adopt additional assumptions to make our framework similar to Hart 1995 . Let there be only one manager, along with the entrepreneur. The asset can be owned by either one. Since the owner has the right to exclude the other agent, we h a ve to specify how the production technology varies with who is excluded. If the entrepreneur owns and excludes the manager, he produces r E i. We assume the manager's investment can a ect the physical asset so that r 0 E 6 = 0. If the manager owns and excludes the entrepreneur, she produces r M i. 11 Absent specialization, the asset is equally valuable in all alternate technologies: r M 0 = r E 0. 12 Also, the marginal value of specialization is higher within the relationship than outside, so that R 0 i r 0 j i, where j = fE;Mg. Finally, w e make the technical assumption r 00 j 0 for j = fE;Mg and jR 00 ij jr 00
E ij. W e analyze three ways ownership can have adverse e ects in this framework.
11
In general, when investment a ects both human and physical capital, total production is a ected by both the investment actually made which a ects physical capital, and the subset of investment made by participants in the production process which a ects their human capital. Rather than carrying both these terms around, which increases the notational burden, we focused only on investment i n h uman capital in section II. In this section we allow i n vestment to a ect physical capital also and the di erence between investments made and investments made by those who participate in production is subsumed into the functions rE and rM. Note that the results hold even if investment a ects human capital only unless otherwise speci ed.
12
Since specialization now a ects the asset, in Ri i refers to the manager's investment if she participates in the production process. R0 is the entrepreneur's production without the manager when the asset has been specialized and is equivalent t o rEi , while rE0 is the entrepreneur's production without the manager when the asset has not been specialized. Proof of Proposition 4. See the appendix. The logic underlying the result is straightforward. The owner can extract a greater share of the surplus ex post only by wielding the out-of-equilibrium threat of leaving the relationship and taking the assets with him. But the condition suggests that specializing reduces the value of the owner's outside option and, hence, the threat. While the owner internalizes this loss, a non owner does not. This leaves the non owner with bigger incentives to invest.
Hart and Moore 1990 rule out this possibility b y assuming that r 0 j i 0 for any j. In other words, they assume that speci c investment not only increases the value of the asset in the relationship R 0 i 0 but also the value of the asset in alternative uses. To the extent that speci c investment implies investment speci c to a relationship and to a particular use of the asset, this assumption is by no means obvious.
If we assume unlike Hart and Moore that investment specializes physical capital, then not only is r 0 M i + r 0 E i 0 plausible, but perhaps the most plausible assumption. The specialization of an asset implies almost by de nition a reduction in the outside value of that asset. Specialization of the sewing machine to the tanner's coarse, thick, shoe leather, may necessitate permanently repositioning the clamps such that they hold the thicker leather, rendering the machine useless for repairing bags and clothes made of thin leather. In fact, that the cobbler does not own the machine is now good for his incentives because by specializing the machine, she reduces the tanner's bargaining power over surplus because r 0 E i 0. 13 If the speci c investment is only in human capital, then it cannot a ect E's alternative use of the asset and r 0 E i = 0. We, then, have: When human capital but not the asset is specialized to the relationship, it is no longer obvious that the owner's outside value with the asset falls with specialization. Nonetheless, even this is plausible. Suppose the cobbler's alternative employment without the sewing machine is as an unskilled laborer. Then her outside value without the asset will not diminish with specialization to shoe making. By contrast, years of working with the coarse shoe leather will diminish her ability to work with ne leather that constitute a substantial proportion of repairs. So the cobbler will reduce her outside option with the asset when she specializes her skills to shoe making, even though the asset itself is not specialized.
Note that if there are multiple Ms, neither random ownership by the Ms nor joint o wnership will solve the problem. Following Hart and Moore 1990 we de ne joint o wnership as a situation in which all owners have a v eto power on the use of the asset. Such v ariations simply distribute the adverse consequences of ownership more widely. The result is di erent if some Ms and E collectively own the asset. In this case, neither the Msnor E has any outside option, because 13 That an employee or non-owner in the case of a subsidiary has an added incentive to specialize the owner's asset to her own human capital so as to reduce the owner's outside option has been noted in the literature. Shleifer and Vishny 1989 label this e ect entrenchment, because it may lead to excessive specialization by the employee. the asset cannot be redeployed without the consent of the other party. In other words, collective ownership implies nobody really has the residual right to exclude others from the asset, so nobody internalizes the loss associated with the decline in the value of the outside option.
Even if r 0 j i 0 for any j, w e can show that ownership can reduce incentives to specialize if we relax one of the following assumptions in GHM: i there is only one type of speci c investment; ii date 1 bargaining takes place in a co-operative w ay. I n terestingly, in both cases the intuition is the same: the owner's ability to use residual control rights to extract surplus in the ex post bargaining e ectively decreases with specialization. This reduces the owner's incentive to specialize vis-a-vis the nonowner. Case 2: Multiple investments Consider, rst, the possibility of an alternative i n vestment B with the same cost as the original investment A. The manager has to choose between the two t ypes of investments at date 0. The return on investment B isRi B , which is uniformly lower than the return on investment A so thatR R . Assume, however, that if she chooses investment B, M can produce without E.
If M has the residual right of control over the asset, she can choose investment B knowing that she will appropriate all the surplus from it. Therefore, M will ine ciently choose B whenever which is never satis ed becauseR R . 14 Therefore, allocating ownership to M will lead to a more severe underinvestment problem whenever condition 17 is satis ed.
Note that this e ect occurs even if M' s i n vestment does not modify the asset r 0 E = 0, but only her human capital. By specializing in A, M loses the outside" opportunity to specialize in 14 The assumption is that E gets more by w orking with M even if M chooses the wrong investment. If this is not correct, M will be red if she does not make i n vestment A and will therefore make the right i n vestment.
B. T h us de facto, b y specializing to A she loses her outside opportunity, e v en if r 0 M 0. By contrast, when she does not own, M's outside opportunity is dominated and the loss is immaterial.
Hence, ownership distorts investment incentives. A more general way of seeing this is that the manager has an incentive t o c hoose investments that minimize the number of agents whose cooperation she needs ex post and with whom she will have to share rents. When the entrepreneur owns, the manager needs his co-operation regardless of the choice of investment because she has to use the asset. This reduces the distortion in her investment incentives. When the manager owns, she no longer needs the entrepreneur's co-operation in investment B where his human capital is redundant. Thus the manager's incentives are distorted away from the social optimal.
Hart and Moore 1990 do discuss in their conclusions the possibility that situations where agents choose projects in addition to levels of investment m a y alter their results. Our contribution here is to suggest that this is part of a more general problem with ownership, which has important implications, for instance, in the analysis of vertical integration see section VI.
Case 3: Strategic Bargaining A similar e ect can be obtained even without multiple projects, provided that we modify the nature of the bargaining game taking place at date 1. If, instead of using the Nash bargaining solution, we adopt some form of strategic bargaining, then ownership might h a ve a negative e ect on the incentive to make speci c investments even if we maintain all the other assumptions in Hart and Moore 1990 . This e ect, analyzed by De Meza and Lockwood 1998 , is another application of the general principal stated above.
In a strategic bargaining situation, each agent gets the larger of what she can hope to get by continuing bargaining and what she can get by exercising her outside option immediately. A speci c investment increases the value at stake from continuing bargaining and, consequently, the outside option is more likely to be dominated. This is tantamount to the outside option e ectively losing value with speci c investment. The interesting feature is that this happens even if the actual value of the outside option increases or remains constant with investment r 0 M 0 and even if M does not have other investment opportunities.
B Ownership and Crowding Out
We h a ve shown above that ownership may directly decrease a manager's incentives to make relationship-speci c investments. In those situations it is clear that granting access to a select group of managers is superior than allocating the ownership of the asset to them. What we show n o w is that ownership could have indirect adverse e ects by reducing the incentive e ects provided by access.
Suppose, for instance, investments are additive, M 1 owns the asset and, for simplicity, assets have n o v alue without E so that r M i = 0. It is easy to see that the only equilibrium is for M 2 to invest zero and for M 1 to invest to the point 1 2 R 0 i 1 = 1. This corresponds to the equilibrium with just one player. Thus, we h a ve the following result:
Proposition 5. When the speci c investments are additive, then allocating ownership to a single manager results in lower total speci c investment than withholding ownership and granting access to two managers.
The intuition here is di erent from the one underlying the adverse incentive e ects of ownership identi ed earlier. The reason why o wnership has adverse e ects here, is because it makes it impossible to generate a rat race between the two managers. Allocating ownership to one manager has the e ect of giving her too much p o wer to start with and, thus, of crowding out the incentives for the other manager to accumulate power through speci c investments. In the appendix we show that this result carries through even in the case of random ownership or of joint o wnership. The intuition is reminiscent o f a w ell known result in the tournament literature: The incentive e ects of a tournament are maximized when all identical players have a similar starting point. This result is related to, but di erent from, Proposition 6 in Hart and Moore 1990 . They show that allocating ownership to an indispensable party such a s E in our framework without whom the asset is worthless does not reduce the other agents' incentives to specialize while possibly increasing E's incentives to invest. By contrast, we show that allocating ownership to E and away from an M strictly increases the other M's incentives to invest. Furthermore, their result depends on E being indispensable, while ours does not.
C Limited Supply of Ownership
Of course, access may also be important when there are many agents who require incentives and there is a limited supply of ownership rights to be distributed among them. For instance, if ownership has to be allocated to E to provide him incentives, regulation of access may b e t h e only instrument with which to provide managers incentives. Thus, access and ownership can co-exist, providing incentives for di erent groups of agents. This is developed more fully in the next section.
IV Integrating Access and Ownership: Internal Organization
Access and ownership need not be substitute mechanisms. In developing the idea that access and ownership can be mutually reinforcing, we obtain a rationale for the internal organization of rms.
A Two T asks
Suppose, for simplicity, that there are only two managers, M 1 and M 2 along with E. A crucial asset say a n i n tegrated cutting and sewing machine is required for production. Two tasks, A and B, e.g., cutting and sewing are required to be performed, each at a di erent location on the asset. A manager can specialize in either task but not both. by both managers in the same task are substitutes, and that R is a step function in the investment made in each task. If a manager m does not join the coalition after specializing, production is obtained by setting i l j to zero in the above formulation.
We assume that if both tasks are specialized to, the asset is worthless in outside use. Intuitively, if both the cutting and sewing settings are welded to work with thick leather, the machine is useless in outside repairs which are largely on thin leather. E who is the only producer of thick leather becomes indispensable. If only one manager specializes in a particular task say cutting, the machine retains its unspecialized outside value with any manager of r M . The assumption that it does not lose any outside value when partially specialized is only for simplicity. Finally, E on his own obtains no outside value with the asset, i.e., r E = 0 . 15 One task adds much more value than the other task. In this setting, we n o w explore the role of internal organization. Given space constraints, our intent i s t o p r o vide an example of why restricting access inside the organization is tantamount t o internal organization, and how it complements ownership.
B The Role of Internal Organization
Suppose E has ownership and allows both managers unrestricted access to the machines. If manager M 1 specializes to task A, manager M 2 has the incentive to specialize to the other task 15 The assumption that investment made a ects the value of the asset, but only the subset of investment made by those who participate in production a ects the value of co-operative output is not implausible. Essentially, i f a cobbler specializes the sewing machine for shoe leather by w elding settings in a way consistent with her preferences, her participation is needed to fully utilize the specialization. If she does not participate in production, the machine will be run by an unspecialized cobbler from the reserve army of those with zero reservation value who nds the specialized settings no more helpful or harmful than settings xed at random. By contrast, because the sewing machine has been welded to handle thick shoe leather, it has little value in handling thin leather which w as the main source of the unspecialized asset's value repairing bags and coats. only if 1 6 R0; k + 1 3 Rk;k , Rk;0 , k 1 6 Rk;0 , k:
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The left hand side is from 6, and is is her net payo if she specializes in task B, while the right hand is her net payo if she specializes in task A and competes with the rst manager. Rewriting the inequality, the second manager specializes ine ciently in the same task if Rk;0 , R0; k 2 Rk;k , Rk;0 :
24 This is the standard problem of the commons, except it occurs inside a rm. Managers will overinvest in trying to grab the lucrative returns from the more critical, or higher value added, task A while neglecting the socially necessary, but less rewarding, task B.
One way for E to prevent this power-seeking is to not allow unlimited access to the asset but, instead, create restrictions internally. F or example, by preventing M 2 from having access to the location where task A is performed, the owner ensures that M 2 chooses her next best alternative. M 2 specializes in task B if 1 6 R0; k + 1 3 Rk;k , Rk;0 , k 0:
25
So if 24 and 25 hold, ownership by E with restricted internal access achieves rst best, while only ownership by E does not. A numerical example consistent with these conditions is Rk;k = 1 0 k;Rk;0 = 7:5k;R0; k = 1 :5k;r M = 4 k.
More generally, the restrictions could take the form of requiring attendance at a particular place, locating units in di erent places, or isolating groups according to functional specialization. They could all be viewed as e orts by the rm to regulate power and, thus, incentives to invest. 16 In other words, internal organizations is, in fact, regulation of internal access.
16
That organizations regulate power by regulating process access in our model is consistent with the view legal scholars have of employment contracts. As Masten 1988 argues, there is a legal di erence between an employment contract and a contract with a contractor. The employee is liable for the process by which w ork is done e.g., he agrees to show u p a t w ork every day, w ork a certain number of hours, and obey reasonable orders. Of course, nothing ensures that the work is done with enthusiasm or e ciency. By contrast, the contractor is held responsible for output but not for the process by which he does it, unless contractually speci ed.
C Does Internal Organization Work Independently of Ownership?
An immediate question is whether internal organization is su cient t o a c hieve the rst best, independent o f o wnership structure. Consider the case where a manager without loss of generality M 1 , and not E, o wns the asset.
She can give access to a speci c task to M 2 , s a y A. M 2 has the incentive to specialize if 1 3 Rk;k , R0; k , k 0: 26 which is true in the numerical example above. But then it turns out that M 1 is better o using the partially specialized asset outside the relationship rather than specializing in task B and sharing rents with M 2 and E, because r M 1 6 R0; k + 1 3 Rk;k , k:
27
The intuition is that by signing away access and power to the more lucrative task to M 2 , she has reduced her own incentive t o i n vest. Interestingly, giving M 2 access to task B does not achieve the rst best either. Now, M 2 has too little incentive t o i n vest because she has been allocated a task which confers few rents. She gets a net payo of 1 3 Rk;k , Rk;0 , k 0:
28
Recall from 25 that privileged access to the task was su cient to motivate M 2 when E owned, but it is not when M 1 owns. The intuition is that M 2 has no ability to make a side-deal with E because E does not own the asset, and this reduces her rents. Thus, ownership by either M 1 or M 2 , e v en when coupled with internal organization, fails to achieve rst best.
So the previous section suggests the right i n ternal organization can help an ownership structure achieve rst best. We h a ve shown in this section that given an internal organization, we m a y not have rst best unless we h a ve an appropriate ownership structure. Thus both ownership and the regulation of access to critical tasks within the organization are integral to making the rm successful. Both can be seen as mechanisms to regulate power and co-ordinate investment in the organization so as to maximize organizational output.
V Application of the Concept of Access: Division of Labor
There are two main ideas in our paper: the positive role of access in motivating speci c investments and the potential negative role ownership might h a ve. In this section, we present a n application of the rst idea, while in the next section we explore some applications of the second one.
Thus far, we h a ve taken the production technology as exogenous. We h a ve shown, however, that a rm with an additive technology can draw forth more speci c investment and achieve a higher level of e ciency. T o the extent that a rm has any in uence on the technology, it will attempt to make it additive.
Division of labor is one example of this. Consider the owner's problem of how to organize workers to produce with a given technology. One way is to divide the process into n tasks and assign each w orker only one task. We call this division of labor. The other way is to let each worker carry out the entire process. We call this craft production. To tie our hands, let us assume that independent o f h o w production is organized, the technology has constant returns to scale in the number of workers, i.e., R n i = nR 1 i, where the superscript indicates how many w orkers are employed in the production process. 17 With division of labor, each w orker's speci c investment is made compatible with the speci c investment of other workers. Thus, speci c investments become additive and the production function is R n P n j=1 i j . 18 Then, each w orker maximizes 7 with R n replacing R.
We can compare this with craft production. There is no interlinkage between the craftsmen so total production is P n j=1 R 1 i j , where R 1 is the production when only one worker uses the production line. The owner of the assets can, essentially, contract separately with each craftsman to produce. Each craftsman gets a net surplus of 1 2 R 1 i , i and chooses i to maximize this.
Using the results derived in section II, it is easy to see that if the entrepreneur chooses the 17 This would be true, for instance, if the technology requires a xed amount o f m a c hinery which can either be operated by n workers each maintaining a xed position on the production line division of labor or operated by n workers each w alking along the production line carrying out each task in succession with the next worker following close behind craft production. Note that both arrangements use the same number of workers, the same amount of machinery, and the machinery is left idle if at all for the same amount of time.
18
I f a w orker does not specialize, she can be replaced by an unskilled worker with reservation value normalized to zero, so the number of workers can be subsumed in the production function. Also, while it is not obvious that each position will be equally important, for simplicity, w e assume this to be the case so that we can focus on the earlier derived symmetric equilibria. number of steps into which the production process can be broken up appropriately, the collective of workers under division of labor always invests more than does each craft worker individually. Speci cally, ni n argmaxf 1 2 R n i , ig = argmaxf 1 2 nR 1 i , ig argmaxf 1 2 R 1 i , ig:
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The rst inequality follows from Proposition 2. 19 The equality follows from the assumption of constant return to scale in workers and the last inequality follows from concavity o f R i and n 1. Workers together learn more under division of labor i.e., they specialize more because they think they will get greater rents if they do so. In reality, they are in a rat-race where all workers learn more though about di erent aspects of production, and competition between workers keeps rents down. Thus through division of labor, the entrepreneur can encourage more speci c investment and hence production. 20 This result sheds some light on an old debate about whether division of labor is e ciency enhancing or simply a form of rent seeking by capitalists. Economists since Adam Smith have thought of division of labor as enhancing e ciency because workers can specialize better doing a single task repeatedly instead of doing multiple tasks. Contrast this with Marglin 1974 who holds that division of labor is simply a way for employers to keep the rents accruing to employees down. These two views seem in contradiction because what incentive will employees have t o specialize if their rents are kept down? It may be that they are required to learn only a small piece of the production process, and cannot help but learning their part well. But this suggests that division of labor works only when the speci c investment required is small. Yet division of labor is employed even when each step of the production process is fairly involved.
Our result reconciles these two viewpoints. It suggests that division of labor is intrinsically e cient because it spurs aggregate speci c investment. At the same time, it vindicates Marglin's and before him, Marx claim that division of labor impoverishes workers. Each individual worker learns less under division of labor and also her share of the surplus decreases.
Another example of this phenomenon is in franchising, when investments to achieve consumer 19 We show in Proposition 2 that the inequality is true for n = 2. Since the owner can choose n he cannot do worse.
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Interestingly, a technology that is constant return to scale in the number of workers becomes increasing returns to scale, at least over a certain range, because speci c investments by w orkers can increase in their number. awareness, such a s a d v ertising, are important. Consider, for example, the practice of the franchisor conceding access to mutually exclusive, but geographically contiguous, territories to di erent franchisees. Advertising expenditures by t wo adjacent franchisees are additive in the sense that they both increase consumer demand but decrease each other's marginal contribution. Thus geographically subdividing the franchising area ensures greater overall advertising than if the franchisor were to o er the entire geographic area to one franchisee. Note that the rationale here is not that multiple franchisees protect the franchisor from ex post expropriation. Since access is contractible these rents can be recouped ex ante. Rather the franchisor enhances investment incentives by creating a rat race between franchisees. Note also that this e ect cannot be obtained by granting ownership of the trademark to any individual franchisee or to the collective.
VI Implications of the Adverse E ects of Ownership

A Vertical Integration
From our prior analysis, the more outside options are burned by specializing, the less an owner is willing to specialize. This conclusion has important implications because it links the desirability of vertical integration to the market structure for specialized and unspecialized goods.
Consider, for instance, the canonical example of Fisher Body and General Motors. According to Klein et al. 1978 , one of the major issues of contention between Fisher Body and GM, which eventually lead to full acquisition of Fisher Body by GM, was Fisher Body's refusal to locate its plants close to GM plants. This speci c investment w as likely to have enhanced production e ciency, but it also had the e ect of reducing the value of the plant in alternative uses e.g., supplying Ford. Fisher Body's management, who owned a large stake in Fisher Body, i n ternalized the loss in future surplus arising from specializing the asset and, thus, resisted this move. By contrast, when Fisher Body became a wholly owned GM subsidiary, the Fisher Body management did not face any personal loss in locating the plants close to GM. Thus, the Fisher Body case is a textbook example of the disincentive created by allocating ownership to those who control investment.
Note that the negative e ect of ownership stems from the di erence in the value of the outside option held by the owner before and after the speci c investment. This e ect, thus, disappears if there is no alternative use the asset can be put to even prior to the speci c investment. In Japan the structure of the market and its business practices put more constraints on a supplier's ability to deploy its assets against the interest of the car maker see, for example, Dore 1983 . Thus the ability of the supplier to use his residual rights opportunistically is limited. Since the adverse e ects of ownership are small, if ownership has positive e ects Japanese car manufacturers should rely more heavily on independent suppliers. These predictions seem consistent with the di erent degree of vertical integration of GM versus Toyota. In the late 1980s, GM employed over 750,000 workers to make 8 million cars, while Toyota had only 65,000 workers producing more than 4.5 million cars.
In summary, the negative e ect of ownership is exacerbated when the number of potential buyers from the specialized producer diminishes dramatically relative to the the numb e r o f p otential buyers from the unspecialized producer. Thus, in an ex post monopsonistic market, the adverse e ect of ownership is particularly severe.
B State Ownership
Following from the above discussion, we identify two situations where a business that has the government as a partner or customer often becomes a business that should be owned by the government.
The rst instance is when the service purchased by the government i s i n trinsically linked to an inalienable power of the government. In civilized societies, the government has a legal monopoly over certain powers such as those of taxation, use of force, and coinage. The government can delegate the provision of services that require the use of these powers to the private sector. However, its continued acquiescence to the private party's temporary use of the powers is necessary for the private party to provide the service.
If there is a falling out between the government and the private party, the latter may not be able to operate without the government delegated powers. If the service requires substantial specialization, the private party n o w has little outside value for its specialized human capital and physical assets. As a result, it has little incentive to specialize ex ante. The government, then, is better o owning the physical assets so that agents have no qualms specializing them and o ering agents long term employment so that they have the incentive to specialize their human capital.
As an example, consider a mint. The government cannot permanently transfer the power to print money to a privately-owned mint. Since the power can always be withdrawn, the private owner has limited incentive to specialize to the needs of the government. Hence the service has, typically, to be provided by the government.
Even if the service provided requires no special power, the government can become essential to a relationship simply by subsidizing the buyers or the suppliers of a certain service. An e ect of a direct or indirect subsidy to authorized suppliers is that unauthorized suppliers nd themselves at a competitive disadvantage and eventually unable to continue providing the service. As in the situation discussed above, thus, the provider depends upon the government's continued acquiescence to operate. Thus, a private party will lack the incentive to specialize. The government, then, is better o owning the physical assets and o ering agents long term employment. As a result, an increase in government subsidies often leads to an expansion of government o wnership.
For example, suppose the government provides national health insurance whereby i t p a ys for the entire cost of a citizen's operation when performed by an authorized health care provider. Given the ex post subsidy, the citizen will only buy from authorized health care providers. The government e ectively controls the citizens' purchase decision by deciding whom to authorize. As a result, health care providers have little incentive to specialize in costly, capital intensive, operations such as transplants for fear of being at the mercy of the government. Thus, the government e n try into insurance also forces it to provide sophisticated operations at its own hospitals, thereby diminishing the role of the private sector.
Our explanation that public ownership results when the structure of power leaves private owners with too little incentive t o i n vest is related to, but di erent from, the one provided by Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 . In their model, government o wnership reduces the private agent's incentive to distort investments towards cost cutting at the expense of quality improvements. If one interprets`not specializing' as`investing in cost cutting', the two models are similar. In their case, however, the di erential rewards from the two i n vestments are determined by a pre-existing contract. In our case, it is endogenously determined by the e ect that specializing has on the value of the asset or human capital in outside uses.
C Third Party Ownership.
The adverse aspects of ownership in our model arise for two reasons. First, the entrepreneur, as a result of his past investments, becomes indispensable. This gives him a claim to future surplus that cannot be sold along with the ownership of the physical asset. Second, ownership increases the manager's opportunities of and bene ts from distorting her investments to appropriate some of the entrepreneur's future rents. This simple observation has a number of interesting consequences.
First, if all the parties involved in production i.e., including the entrepreneur have to make substantial speci c investments over time, it may be optimal for a completely unrelated third party to own the assets. The third party essentially absorbs the opportunity losses from specialization. It is precisely because it does not make speci c investments that it is in the best position to bear the losses. Another way o f s a ying this is that the third party holds power so that the agents critical to production do not use the power of ownership against each other. 21 The third party could delegate many o f t h e p o wers of ownership that are unlikely to be misused to a managerial hierarchy. Of course, the third party will retain the power to re the production team or the managing hierarchy from the assets if it does not specialize. Since this does not happen in equilibrium, the third party m a y give the appearance of being powerless and may, in fact, not have m uch more power than hiring, ring, and controlling the sale of assets. 22 Second, where ownership of assets should optimally lie may c hange over time. When an inventor or entrepreneur starts out, there is little value to speak of and, thus, little for others to appropriate through opportunistic investment. Since the expected payo from appropriate investment is large relative to the payo s from opportunism, ownership typically enhances the 21 The notion that the third party absorbs regions of the payo distribution that should not be absorbed by investing parties is similar to Holmstrom 1982 . Where we di er is in the idea that those who have access, and thus the privileged right t o i n vest, have a kind of control right which can be misused when coupled with the control rights of ownership. Therefore, unlike Holmstrom, the third party also absorbs control rights.
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The role of the outside party is related to, but di erent from, Hansmann 1988 . He argues that ownership may be e ciently held by parties who do not have i n terests opposed to insiders, because this will eliminate ine cient decisions ex post. We argue that ownership may be held by third parties precisely because they do not have t o specialize. In other words, their interests may be opposed to those of the insiders, but being outsiders, they have fewer instruments with which t o c hange the payo s to other agents within the rm. Some argue that the providers of capital have few instruments to enforce their rights other than ownership which i s w h y they have o wnership. But if in fact ownership enhanced the incentives of management and labor to specialize, it would make sense for the providers of capital to get ownership rights contingent only on not being repaid i.e., providers of capital would hold debt, not equity. Ownership would optimally reside with labor or management. Our theory explains why such an arrangement is sub-optimal.
incentives to make speci c investments. At this stage the most crucial investments are made by the inventor entrepreneur, so he should own the start-up company. But once the enterprise becomes larger, two new issues arise. First, the speci c investments of others such as professional managers becomes important. Second, the amount of future rents up for grabs is generally much larger. On the one hand, it may b e u n wise to give o wnership to managers, since they may attempt to reduce the implicit claims the entrepreneur has by c hanging the direction of the rm overly. 23 On the other hand, the entrepreneur may ine ciently attempt to capture even more surplus by maintaining the rm too long on a path that preserves his usefulness. The notorious focus of inventors on continuing R&D rather than on developing products for commercial production is a case in point. At this point, our work would suggest that co-operation is best achieved if the rm is owned by third parties. 24 
D Stakeholders vs Shareholders
Should stakeholders have property rights in the rm? There is an ongoing debate about whether those who make speci c investments to the rm such as employees, suppliers, and nanciers should have explicit property rights that prevent shareholders or managers acting on their behalf from dispossessing them on a whim. Without the protection provided by o wnership, the argument goes, valuable speci c investments will not be made see Summers 1988 and Blair 1995 . 25 Our work adds two new perspectives to this debate. First, the debate follows the property rights view in ignoring the deadening e ect that property rights might h a ve on the incentive to make speci c investments. It implicitly assumes that greater property rights improve the incentives of stakeholders to invest. However, our model points out that insecurity m a y encourage rather than discourage speci c investment b y stakeholders.
Second, by focussing on con icts between stakeholders and shareholders, the debate largely 23 See Myers 1996 , who argues that an entrepreneur will spread control through an initial public o ering to avoid this. 24 The above argument that residual decision rights are often allocated to a neutral third party helps explain other phenomena. For example, in many long term contracts the right to make decisions in all the contingencies not explicitly covered in the contract reside with a neutral, third-party arbitrator.
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Of course, there is also a call for recognizing the rights of stakeholders on fairness grounds. This presupposes that the past speci c investments made by the stakeholders do not give them adequate power. This is likely to occur when changes in technology makes past speci c investment obsolete.
ignores con ict between stakeholders. Stakeholders may h a ve stronger abilities to ine ciently dispossess each other, and ownership will give them additional power to do so. Instead shareholders, precisely because of their remoteness from the production process, may be in a better position to make decisions that are in the best interests of the rm.
VII Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the role played by di erent sources of power in organizations. Staying within the contractibility assumptions of the property rights view, we identify a new and potentially more powerful instrument to motivate speci c investments: restricted access to critical assets. When we incorporate this additional source of power in a theory of the rm, and re ect on the adverse e ects of power from property rights, we can broaden the de nition of the rm, understand the role played by i n ternal organization, and explain a variety of real-world institutional arrangements.
Clearly, this is just a beginning in understanding the sources of power that are important i n a rm. One avenue for future research is to examine the role of organizational structures, such a s hierarchy, in moulding power and distributing it through the organization. For an initial attempt at this, see Rajan and Zingales 1997 . Another is to study the importance of information as a source of power see Aghion and Tirole 1997. We h a ve focused in this paper on how the ability to grab power can be used to motivate investment. There is a dark side to this in that the fear that others will grab power can lead to excessive p o wer-seeking which, in turn, may prevent otherwise-value-enhancing transactions from taking place see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 1996. More generally, the role of power in organizations is poorly understood. Unlike sociologists who have studied these issues in some detail, mainstream economists have largely stayed away, partly because power is irrelevant in a complete contract world. There is ample room to marry some of the insights sociologists have with the rich set of tools economists have developed to further our understanding of the subject. It is easy to verify that ni n n , 1i n , 1.
ii The rst best level in this case is i FB = , 1. Using 8, i n = 3,6
2n+1 . F or n going to in nity, the aggregate level of investment will be lim n!1 ni n = n 3 , 6 2n + 1 = 3 2 , 3:
44
If 4 increasing the number of managers will eventually lead to overinvestment. Therefore, the optimal number of managers who will be granted access to the asset is uniquely determined and it is n = ,1 ,4 . 2 Proof of Lemma 3.
i First, we prove that Ri 1 ; i 2 is globally concave. Since Ri 1 ; i 2 has decreasing return to scale, it is homogenous of degree less than 1. This implies that R 1 and R 2 are homogenous of degree less than zero. Applying the Euler's theorem this implies ii The rst best level of investments is determined by the same FOC as 10, where R 1 and R 2 are not multiplied by 1 2 . The result then follows from R ii i A ; i B 0 for i = 1 ; 2. 2 Proof of Proposition 3. If we ctitiously split the single manager into two selves, then the co-operative solution is nothing but the intersection between the two reaction functions represented by 10. To prove that the nonco-operative solution is always at a lower level of i A and i B it is su cient t o p r o ve that all reaction functions are monotonically increasing and that the reaction functions in the two manager-case are bounded by the two ctitious reaction functions of the co-operative case. By implicit di erentiation of 10 we h a ve that diA diB = , R12 R11 0, theus the co-operative" reaction function is strictly increasing. Similarly, b y implicit di erentiation of 12 we h a ve that diA diB = , 1 3 R12 1 6 R11i A 1 ;0+ 1 3 R11i A 1 ;i B 2 0, thus the reaction function is strictly increasing. For any i B we h a ve that 1 6 R 1 i 1 ; 0 + 1 3 R 1 i 1 ; i B 1 2 R 1 i 1 ; i B . Then, by concavity o f R with respect to i A , the nonco-operative best response to i B is always lower than the co-operative best response. Thus, the reaction function always lies below. Applying the same reasoning to the other reaction function, the result follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let i o = argmaxf 1 2 Ri + 1
Concavity o f R ensures that the level of investment is less then the one obtained when E owns see equation 37 . If E jointly owns with the two M s, the payo of each manager is also 50, because E is indispensable. Thus, the same conclusion follows.
